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A B S T R A C T
Associations have been labelled the main ‘building blocks ’ for creating social
capital. It has been argued that community associations need to transform
‘bonding’ into ‘bridging’ ties to ‘reach out ’ while also creating ‘ linking’ ties to
‘ scale up’. External development actions follow a reverse logic in promoting
these associations : they assume that linking ties with the external intervener will
reinforce prior social capital endowments. This article highlights the inherent
diﬃculties of such a ‘social engineering ’ approach in the context of post-conﬂict
reconstruction, describing three development interventions in the north of
Burundi. It deﬁnes the process of ‘ institutional syncretism’ – merging local
with global institutional settings – as a key element to social capital building. The
ﬁndings illustrate how the three interventions failed to reach this objective, and
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question ‘bridging’ associations as ‘universal blueprints ’ for restoring social
cohesion within the liberal peace model for post-conﬂict reconstruction.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Associations have been labelled the main ‘building blocks ’ for creating
social capital. The reconciliatory nature of bridging associations – uniting
groups in society that opposed each other during conﬂict – is welcomed in
post-conﬂict situations (Colletta & Cullen 2000a, 2000b). Social capital
literature argues that community associations need to transform bonding
into bridging ties to ‘reach out ’, while also creating linking ties to ‘ scale
up’ the impact of the associations (Titeca & Vervisch 2008; Woolcock
2002). However, it is not self-evident that social capital can be created
from the outside. When external development agencies promote the cre-
ation of associations they follow a reverse logic, assuming that linking ties
with the external intervener will create or reinforce locally produced social
capital endowments.
The article examines this ‘ social engineering’ approach, presenting a
case study of three interventions by non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) in post-conﬂict Burundi. Burundi is slowly emerging from a
civil war that lasted over ten years.1 After three decades (1960s–90s) of
authoritarian and military rule by the ethnic Tutsi minority, the ﬁrst de-
mocratically elected Hutu president was murdered soon after his ap-
pointment in 1993. In the civil war that followed, approximately 300,000
people lost their lives (Lemarchand 2009). Now, following a transition
period that led to the 2005 elections, Burundi ﬁnds itself in a post-conﬂict
reconstruction phase, featuring many of the external interventions noted
above. The impact on social capital of these interventions will be analysed
in terms of their success in creating bridging community associations.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, it enumerates
the arguments as to why community associations are seen as ‘building
blocks ’ for social capital, and how in particular bridging community as-
sociations ﬁt into the liberal peace model for post-conﬂict reconstruction.
Second, it presents a brief discussion of the ‘constructability ’ of social
capital, while also referring to the critical civil society literature. Third,
after outlining the state of Burundi and its historical social capital en-
dowments, it discusses the three development interventions. All three in-
terventions illustrate their failure to initiate a process of ‘ institutional
syncretism’ (Galvan 2007), and question ‘bridging’ associations as ‘uni-
versal blueprints ’ for restoring social cohesion within the liberal peace
model for post-conﬂict reconstruction.
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S O C I A L C A P I T A L, C O MM U N I T Y A S S O C I A T I O N S A N D
P O S T-C O N F L I C T R E C O N S T R U C T I O N
The strong link between social capital and civil society is one of the main
consequences of Robert Putnam’s work. He equates social capital with
horizontal associations, in what he calls ‘networks of civic engagement’
(Putnam 1993: 171). These associations have been labelled the main
‘building blocks ’ of social capital, which Putnam (1995: 664–5) deﬁnes
as ‘ the features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable
participants to act together more eﬀectively to pursue shared objectives ’.
The equation between social capital and community associations has
tempted some policy makers to oversimplify the debate. Many deﬁne a
vibrant civil society as the ‘missing link’ (Grootaert 1998) to economic
development and democracy. Community associations rapidly became
promising new ‘actors ’ in the ‘development industry ’.2 ‘Membership in
groups with particular characteristics ’ (Narayan 1997: vii) became one of
the main proxy measures to build social capital. For policy makers, these
studies provide an easy solution – building community associations means
building social capital – and an easy way to measure the progress and
success of their policies (predicated simply on ‘How many new associ-
ations were built or strengthened?’).
With regard to post-conﬂict reconstruction, in particular the potential
bridging character is valued as positive (Pickering 2006) : conﬂict is linked to
high stocks of bonding and low stocks of bridging social capital (Colletta &
Cullen 2000a, 2000b). Whereas bonding capital refers to exclusive soli-
darity based on ethnicity, religion, cast or class, bridging capital refers to
inclusive solidarity, uniting people from diﬀerent backgrounds (Woolcock
& Narayan 2000). Community associations are labelled as instruments
‘par excellence’ to transform this ‘exclusive’ bonding solidarity within
groups into more ‘ inclusive’ bridging solidarity between these groups.
In this respect, economic and social reconstruction eﬀorts will only be
eﬀective if they involve and bridge between diﬀerent social groups
(Colletta et al. 1996; Fischer 2004). A particular case of group integration is
after ethnic conﬂict. Institutions fostering repeated inter-ethnic interaction
while addressing practical concerns support reconciliation between ethnic
groups (Pickering 2006: 79), for example an association in which Hutu and
Tutsi widows work together after the Rwandan genocide (Colletta &
Cullen 2000b: 113). This explains why multi-ethnic community associ-
ations are seen as ‘agents of peace’ (Varshney 2001: 363), as they increase
the trust between and within communities in post-conﬂict situations
(Belloni 2008: 193).
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In sum, this liberal-pluralist conception of civil society and ‘bridging’
associations can be framed within the broader ‘ liberal peace’ model. The
goal of this model is the rapid modernisation of societies through the
construction of new and liberal institutions (Daley 2008: 34). Donor in-
terventions therefore place great emphasis on civil society strengthening.
These civil society organisations are meant to build social capital in two
particular ways (Paﬀenholz 2009). On the one hand, in-group socialisation
should support the practice of democratic values and attitudes within so-
ciety. On the other hand, and this is speciﬁc to post-conﬂict settings, they
should facilitate cooperation through joint development activities between
adversarial groups in society, resulting in inter-group social cohesion or
the much praised ‘bridging’ social capital. There is therefore a great em-
phasis on the quantitative growth of these associations (Belloni 2001 : 168;
Henderson 2002), and as Duﬃeld (2002) and Goodhand (2006) indicate,
NGOs in particular are expected to build social capital and strengthen
local civil society, which turns their aid into a strategic tool for conﬂict
resolution and social reconstruction.
This leads us to the following two fundamental questions for social
capital. First, how can social capital be constructed? Second, how can
external development interventions play a role in this process? As argued
above, the latter may seem a rhetorical question, as the ‘constructability ’
of social capital in policy circles no longer seems to be an issue: it is seen as
a ‘ technical ﬁx’ which can be constructed regardless of the context. Of
course, there is less consensus about this among social capital scholars.
This debate is brieﬂy discussed in the next section.
T H E ‘ C O N S T R U C T A B I L I T Y’ O F S O C I A L C A P I T A L R E V I S I T E D
Putnam’s (1993) path dependency model argues that the construction of
social capital is the outcome of historical processes. In his Italian study,
Putnam illustrates this with a historical account of the republican tradition
to explain the high degree of ‘civicness ’ in the Italian city states. The
presence of such social capital endowments is then perceived as vitally
important for the further development of social capital in societies. This
‘endowment view’ (Evans 1996: 1124) gives an idea of social capital stocks
emerging over long periods of time, leaving little room for change. Others
point to the fact that social capital patterns are neither stable nor given,
and that contemporary institutional arrangements can facilitate or erode
the production and maintenance of social capital stocks (Hooghe & Stolle
2003: 6). In this view, prior endowments of social capital are not the key
constraining factor, as ‘ soft technologies ’ on an organisational level and
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‘ institutional entrepreneurship’ can build new stocks of social capital or
change existing stocks (Evans 1996: 1124). For Evans, the critical question
under this ‘constructability view’ is how existing endowments of social
capital can be ‘scaled up’ to increase the eﬃciency of solidarity ties and
societal action. Supporters of this view consider both the state and civil
society as two main actors capable of supporting this ‘ scaling-up’ process
(Fox 1996). The two views are not completely opposed, as the discussion is
more subtle and handles the relative importance of prior ‘endowments’
on the one hand and the facilitating ‘ institutional settings ’ on the other.
This helps us to sharpen our analysis of external development inter-
ventions. It puts the process of ‘ institutional syncretism’ (Galvan 2007) at
the heart of the debate. Institutions can be deﬁned in terms of layered
social structures (organisation, networks etc.), the norms (or ‘rules of the
game’) that govern these structures, and underlying cultural markers
(social identities) (Bastiaensen et al. 2002: 10 ; 2005: 980). Galvan (2007:
62–3) deﬁnes institutional syncretism as ‘ the creative recombination of
institutional elements (organisational structures, rules, habits and values)
derived from more than one socio-cultural origin (e.g. from local
‘‘ tradition’’ and globalised ‘‘modern’’ models) ’. Whereas Galvan explores
the capacity of the local population (the ‘recipients ’ of institutional
engineering) to recombine these institutional settings from diﬀerent origins,
we focus more on this capacity from the ‘supply side’ ; as such, the main
question is if and how well development agencies can play the role of
‘ institutional entrepreneur’, and introduce new globalised and ‘modern’
‘ institutional settings ’, which are able to syncretise with prior local ‘ tra-
ditional ’ social capital endowments.
As noted in the sections above, community associations are considered
an excellent and widely used example of a new ‘ institutional setting’ for
constructing social capital. From an ‘endowment perspective ’, the as-
sumption is that community associations follow a linear progression:
transforming bonding into bridging ties to ‘reach out ’ while also creating
linking ties to ‘ scale up’ the impact of social capital endowments (Titeca &
Vervisch 2008). These steps are clariﬁed for example in the roles Brown
(1991) allocates to organisations in sustainable development : the ability to
maintain local eﬀort, the ability to create bridging ties to other organisa-
tions and the ability to inﬂuence politics through vertical ties. However,
when external development interventions promote the creation of such
associations they follow a reverse logic, assuming that linking ties with the
external intervener will reinforce prior social capital endowments.
Through the introduction of linking social capital – the capacity of
the local population to leverage global, ‘modern’ or exogenous ‘ ideas,
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information, and resources ’ (Woolcock 2002: 26) from an external
agent – the aim is to reinforce existing local, ‘ traditional ’ or endogenous,
bonding, bridging and linking social capital endowments. This reveals a
clear ‘constructability view’, identifying the external agency as a social
engineer using institutional ‘ soft technologies ’ (Evans 1996: 1124). These
‘ soft technologies ’ refer to both the exact content of the induced linking
social capital (e.g. ﬁnancial resources, knowledge transfer etc.) and the new
‘ institutional setting’ in which these are made accessible (e.g. community
associations).
In other words, institutional syncretism highlights how external inter-
ventions should be seen as a fragile process : on the one hand, they cannot
be purely externally driven ‘constructability ’ exercises, but should rely on
local dynamics of change; yet, and on the other hand, these interventions
should also be careful with local ‘endowments’ of social capital, as each of
them has its particular diﬃculties.
Strongly externally driven support has particular dangers for the con-
struction of social capital and community associations. This becomes clear
when looking at the critical civil society literature, in which three par-
ticular problems are identiﬁed in external support to community associ-
ations. First, by considering the support to community associations as a
technical enterprise, the latter are seen as apolitical and decontextualised
‘universal blueprints ’, whereas community associations are deeply em-
bedded in the social and political context. Political and societal power
therefore may have a negative impact on the political eﬃcacy and par-
ticipation of the association, and may disempower rather than empower
its members (Beck 2003; Blaney & Pasha 1993). In other words, successful
support for community associations needs to take into account local rea-
lities rather than considering this a technical and decontextualised ‘ﬁx’.
Second, external development interventions enable association leaders to
build up outside legitimacy and, as a consequence, prevent the auton-
omous evolution of leadership on total accountability vis-a`-vis the associ-
ation members (Platteau & Gaspart 2003: 1700; Bierschenk et al. 2000). In
other words, linking social capital, which is central to the ‘constructability
view’, has potential dangers. As identiﬁed by Evans (1996), linking capital
has the potential to produce synergy between local dynamic processes of
social capital and the policies of external interveners, including the state
and (inter)national civil society. However, this is also potentially danger-
ous : ‘gatekeepers ’ who monopolise this linking capital (resources, contacts
with external funders and so on) can negatively impact the association
when they are not held to account by the rest of the association, leading to
authoritarian tendencies or corruption. In other words, the impact of the
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external intervention can be strongly negative when the association lacks
suﬃcient bonding and bridging social capital endowments to handle this
externally induced linking social capital (Titeca & Vervisch 2008). Third,
by using civil society associations (such as community associations) as
cheap implementing agents for donor agents, these associations become
passive beneﬁciaries instead of empowered citizens, concerned to im-
plement the donor’s changing priorities and dependent on the continuous
presence of the international community. In such a situation, the strong
reliance of civil society associations on donor aid has a strongly negative
eﬀect on them, and limits their potential for reconciliation and democra-
tisation (Belloni 2001: 175–6; Hulme & Edwards 1996; Robinson 1995).
There is also the sustainability problem: associations may cease to exist
when the funding ends, and, inversely, may only arise because there is a
funding opportunity (Ottaway & Chung 1999). Lastly, donors may harm
the spontaneous development of bridging associations by imposing speciﬁc
goals (Pickering 2006). In summary, these multiple criticisms highlight the
danger of ‘ institutional monocropping’, or ‘ the imposition of blueprints
based on idealized versions of Anglo-American institutions, the applica-
bility of which is presumed to transcend national circumstances and cul-
tures ’. There is therefore a need to ‘ increase rather than diminish, local
input and experimentation’ (Evans 2004: 30).
The syncretisation of external ‘ institutional settings ’ with local social
capital endowments remains however a fragile process, as local endow-
ments of social capital are not automatically positive. Putnam (1993) has
made considerable eﬀorts to explain the diﬀerence between ‘bad’ vertical
patron–client networks that are integrated in the ‘amoral familism’ pres-
ent in the south of Italy, and ‘good’ horizontal civic networks which,
according to Putnam, explain the working of democracy in northern Italy.
Therefore, Putnam (2004) seeks to distinguish between ‘responsive’ and
‘unresponsive’ linking social capital, in which the ‘unresponsive’ form can
lead towards nepotism, corruption and suppression (Szreter & Woolcock
2004). In other words, social capital has a ‘down’ or ‘dark’ side (Portes &
Landolt 1996) or may be ‘perverse ’ (Rubio 1997). Institutional syncretism
with ‘soft ’ technologies may be unable to change these ‘unresponsive’
forms of social capital, and may therefore even ‘scale up’ corruption,
nepotism and suppression. For external development actors, the real
challenge therefore lies in developing new ‘ institutional settings ’ that are
‘ soft ’ enough to adapt to prior social capital endowments, but ‘strong’
enough to change or reinforce these endowments to bring positive results.
This fragile process puts institutional syncretism at the centre of the debate
on social capital building. As Galvan (2007: 70) explains : ‘ institutional
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syncretism … is neither the wholesale adoption of externally derived,
‘‘modern’’ rules and norms, nor the unreﬂexive reproduction of existing
local or ‘‘ traditional ’’ regularised habits and practices ’. These challenges
are at the heart of external interventions to build social capital, as will
become clear throughout the case studies in the Burundian context, all
three of which failed in this fragile process.
S O C I A L C A P I T A L E N D OW M E N T S I N B U R U N D I A N S O C I E T Y
Burundi does not have a strong associational tradition. First, Burundian
society was much more vertically than horizontally stratiﬁed, with patron–
client ties to a great extent determining the outlook of Burundian social life
(Laely 1997; Lemarchand 1995). A second historical element is the fact
that social organisation beyond the family has been minimal in Burundi :
Burundians lived scattered on the hills in their isolated homestead or rugo,
and not in villages (Uvin 2009: 69–70). Third, most ‘ formal ’ associational
life that did exist was enforced from above, and left a negative impression:
e.g. ‘paternalistic ’ cooperatives under Belgian colonial rule (Badionona-
Tshondo 1993), and the Bagaza regime (Second Republic, 1976–87) con-
trolling the peasantry through cooperatives and villagisation (attempt to
centralise the rural masses into villages) (Lemarchand 1995). In addition,
the Burundian state has made considerable eﬀorts to destroy social capital
not under its control, the most famous case being the muzzling of the
Catholic Church during the 1980s (Longman 2005). Burundi has also been
confronted with the ‘dark side’ (Portes & Landolt 1996) of ethnically ex-
clusive bonding social capital : several youth groups (Jeunesse Nationaliste
Rwagasore ; Sans Echec, Sans De´faite) illustrate how civil society groups have
adopted a genocidal logic and taken part in ethnic violence (Daley 2008).
In sum, the Burundian people have little experience in voluntary, bridging
associational life at grass-roots level. Instead, they have generally negative
feelings towards the forced (cooperatives, villagisation), suppressed (con-
ﬂict with the church), or dark (ethnic youth militias) character of associ-
ational or other collective action experiments.
Ethnic violence, and the civil war from 1993 onwards, inﬂuenced social
capital endowments in two ways. On the one hand, ethnic strife clearly
destroyed existing stocks of social capital. Massive displacement tore apart
families and community life : recent statistics indicate that 52% of the total
population have ﬂed their homes at least once since 1993 (Uvin 2009: 29).
The crisis led to a general decline of mutual help and solidarity, and a
further segmentation of economic groups (rich/poor) (ibid.). On the other
hand, civil war also transformed social capital. During the civil war, most
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of Burundi was divided into Hutu and Tutsi ‘enclaves’ or ‘colonies ’ (Laely
1997: 695). The capital Bujumbura was divided into Hutu and Tutsi
quartiers ; walking through the wrong district meant certain death. In the
countryside, the Tutsi population ﬂed to secure Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP) camps, while the Hutu population was forcefully displaced
into camps de regroupement (HRW 1998). In social capital terms, one could
speak of a country of ‘weak bridges, strong bonds’, in which inter-ethnic
bridging interactions were replaced by more inward-looking ethnic
bonding ties, resulting in an ‘us versus them’ rhetoric (Brachet & Wolpe
2005: 6).
Paradoxically, since 1993, and even more since the Arusha peace
agreements of 2000, grass-roots associations have mushroomed across
Burundian hillsides. The explanation is twofold (Sebudandi & Nduwayo
2002). On the one hand, civil war pushed the Burundian population even
more towards self-help and mutual help, since the capacity of the state to
deliver basic public services deteriorated dramatically. On the other, the
proliferation of associations was externally driven, coinciding with the
arrival of various international and multilateral aid agencies, donors and
NGOs. As a general strategy, the international community used bricks-
and-mortar projects as a ‘vehicle to address social issues, by strengthening
inter-group trust and the capacity of communities to collaborate eﬀec-
tively and manage conﬂict without resort to violence’ (Brachet & Wolpe
2005: 4). As prescribed by social capital literature, bridging multi-ethnic
community associations were at the centre of this approach (for an ela-
borated illustration see Rupiya & Schuller tot Peursum 2009). The
emergence of a vibrant civil society at grass-roots level, promoting rec-
onciliation and community development, was therefore seen as a positive
evolution and part of a conﬂict-sensitive development strategy for Burundi
(Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 7).
T H E C A S E S : I N T R O D U C I N G N E W ‘ I N S T I T U T I O N A L S E T T I N G S’
Data and analysis are based on ten months of ﬁeldwork on three collines
(hillsides, administrative units) in 2006 and 2007.3 Each of the collines pre-
sented an illustrative ‘ typical case ’ (Patton 2002: 236) of the diﬀerent in-
terventions of three development agencies : Burara (CIBA), Tangara
(LITA) and Cumba (CLC).4 The ﬁeldwork was carried out in cooperation
with a team of local research assistants by conducting focus group dis-
cussions and semi-structured interviews.5
CIBA, LITA and CLC are three American-based international NGOs
that introduced livelihood projects under the umbrella of the Livelihood
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Security Initiative Consortium (LSIC), funded by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) (LSIC 2004).6 The
overall objective of LSIC was the support of sustainable livelihood strate-
gies through agricultural production, livestock restocking, and natural
resource management. The projects were implemented in the north of
Burundi between 2005 and 2007, and are illustrative for reconstruction
eﬀorts in Burundi : livelihood interventions are identiﬁed as appropriate
instruments to implement post-conﬂict reconstruction policies in protrac-
ted crisis situations (Russo et al. 2008) ; their focus on food security aligned
well with the Burundian context of protracted food insecurity and the
critical role of the agricultural sector in the livelihoods of Burundian
households. Because of the Consortium construction, all three NGO
projects had a similar focus.
The strengthening of community associations was linked to two par-
ticular objectives of the Consortium project proposal. On the one hand,
associations were used to create new economic opportunities through the
promotion of agro-enterprise development and income-generating activi-
ties. On the other, they were used to reduce community conﬂicts. For all
consortium partners, strengthening associational life, with special atten-
tion to the ethnic and gender dimensions, was a strategy to increase local
capacity for conﬂict resolution. In fact, the number of associations and the
number of households participating in associational life are the only two
indicators to measure this speciﬁc objective of community conﬂict
reduction (Morinie`re et al. 2007: 25–6).7 As such, the Consortium proposal
ﬁts well the ‘ liberal peace’ policy agenda, which urges NGOs to combine
economic and social reconstruction, turning their aid into a strategic tool
for conﬂict resolution (Duﬃeld 2002; Goodhand 2006). Furthermore,
it subscribes to the hypothesis that associations are able to combine
addressing concrete practical concerns (e.g. income-generating activities)
with reconciliation of adversarial parties (e.g. reduction of com-
munity conﬂicts) through repeated social interaction (see e.g. Pickering
2006: 79).
Although all three NGO-projects had a similar focus, it was still possible
to make a fruitful comparison, as the three agencies had diﬀerent philo-
sophies on the use and utility of community associations, as will become
clear throughout the case studies.
CIBA on Burara colline : associations as technical subcontractors
The ﬁrst case-study is the intervention of CIBA on Burara colline. This
colline is located near the administrative centre of Busoni commune, which
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links both sides of the hills surrounding the Muhembezi wetland. A large
IDP camp straddles both sides of the wetland. For several reasons, Burara
colline, and Busoni commune in general, have a clear ethnic segregation:
a politically conscious Tutsi minority in the centre and a Hutu majority on
the surrounding collines. First, Burara has a considerable group of resettled
Tutsi near its centre (the IDP camps). In addition, this Tutsi group has
direct links with national politics and the Tutsi elite in the capital. Several
important ﬁgures within the Uprona (Tutsi) party originate from Busoni
commune. Consequently, the local political struggle between the CNDD-
FDD (Hutu) party, which won the 2005 elections (also on a communal
level), and the Uprona (Tutsi) party was particularly intense, while ethnic
tensions remained prevalent in the commune. Busoni commune therefore
was an exception in northern Burundi, in which the CNDD-FDD in
general held a very strong position (as was the case on the other studied
collines). Nevertheless, this local political struggle did not substantially aﬀect
the functioning of the community associations related to the CIBA project.
As will become clear, this can be explained through CIBA’s close technical
follow-up of the community associations, leaving minimal room for local
political power relations to inﬂuence their functioning.
Of the three development agencies studied, CIBA had the most explicit
focus on technical end results such as improved irrigation systems in the
wetlands, water tap infrastructure, anti-erosion measures and road pro-
tection, improvement of local livestock by cross-breeding, and the certiﬁ-
cation of improved rice seed varieties. This was reﬂected in the staﬀ policy,
as technical staﬀ (agronomists, veterinarians, engineers) outnumbered so-
cial workers. In comparison with the other studied projects, CIBA there-
fore followed a rather top-down approach to achieve these technical end
results : each speciﬁc technical end result was closely followed and mon-
itored by one particular technical staﬀ member – a constructional engin-
eer for the irrigation system, a forester for the anti-erosion measures, a
veterinarian for the livestock component, and so on. As a consequence,
technical staﬀ were present daily on the collines to follow up the project
activities. This ‘ technical ’ focus also substantially guided the constitution
of the community associations, as associations were clearly linked to spe-
ciﬁc technical project objectives.
A ﬁrst illustration of this technical approach are the anti-erosion as-
sociations. Because of deforestation and extensive land use, each season
heavy rains cause ﬂoods, landslides and further degradation of the soil.
Anti-erosion measures (contour lines and hedges) had previously been
executed through food-for-work (FFW) and cash-for-work (CFW) pro-
grammes, also under the supervision of CIBA and the World Food
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Programme (WFP) in Burara. After the FFW programme stopped, CIBA
preferred to make past eﬀorts sustainable, raising public awareness to
create one anti-erosion association for each colline, since soil protection was
best organised by geographical entities. Although the associations were set
up, the population did not accept these changes. Until that time, food aid
compensation was the main incentive for the people involved. In their
minds, associations represented a continuation of the FFW programme, as
they expected to receive the same incentive (food aid) for the same work
(contour lines), but delivered through a new channel or ‘gateway’ (via the
association instead of individually). For them, the new associations were
technical subcontractors, which should be paid according to the delivered
services within the scope of the livelihood project. The fact that there was
little or no coordination among the intervening actors made the situation
even more complex, as other NGOs did compensate for the anti-erosion
works on neighbouring hillsides. CIBA also had contradictions in its own
approach. While staﬀ tried to motivate the population to implement anti-
erosion activities without payment, other staﬀ paid the wages of the casual
workers repairing the roads. Thus, when it became clear that food com-
pensation would not follow, most of the anti-erosion associations stopped
their activities and ceased to exist.
A second type of association facilitated the implementation of the rice
programme in the Muhembuzi wetland. First, water user committees were
established to maintain the irrigation system. Second, these committees
were transformed into rice farmer groups to ease the technical support and
to structure the rice programme. Third, all sixty-nine rice farmer groups
were united into a single rice cooperative, to ease the commercialisation of
rice production, and improve market access. These stages clearly illustrate
the assumed linear progression of community associations as mentioned in
the theoretical section: bonding social capital (the ability to maintain local
eﬀorts in the management of the irrigation system) is complemented by
bridging capital (the ability to create bridges and unite all rice farmers in
the wetland) to create linking social capital (the ability to inﬂuence the rice
market through the rice cooperative). However, also in this case, associ-
ations functioned as new ‘aid gateways ’. On the one hand, people accepted
the new social infrastructure of water user committees, rice farmer groups
and the cooperative because CIBA promised to buy up the rice production
during project years. On the other hand, community associations served
as temporary intermediaries to transfer knowledge, skills and technology.
As one farmer argued: ‘The associations were founded because of CIBA’s
aid. Now, we know about modern agriculture. If the aid is working, we
will use this knowledge for our own ﬁelds, but the associations will stop
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existing’ (focus group, 20.04.2007, CIBA project, Burara). Indeed, once
the project had ﬁnished, the majority of the rice farmer groups ceased to
exist.8
In all cases, CIBA used associations in speciﬁc situations where collec-
tive action problems arose : natural resource management (the mainten-
ance of the irrigation system in the wetland and anti-erosion measures on
the hillsides) (e.g. Krishna & Uphoﬀ 1999; Pretty & Ward 2001), and the
commercialisation and marketing of agricultural production (the rice
programme in the wetland) (e.g. Bebbington & Carroll 2000; Sorensen
2000). However, these associations never merged with existing social
capital endowments. Most associations remained exogenous or ‘alien’
institutional settings, having a reason for existence only within the scope of
the CIBA project.
To a great extent, this lack of institutional syncretism (cf. Galvan 2007)
can be explained by the fact that the associations, as new institutional
settings, were designed with reference to external technological end re-
sults, rather than to local social capital endowments. In all three cases,
their constitution and composition were based on technical criteria. For
example, in the wetland, farmers were asked to form groups of thirty
people with adjacent plots : these criteria of proximity and group size
were based not on prior social organisation, but on maintaining the
newly introduced irrigation system. The same holds true for the anti-
erosion association: the fact that its scope coincided with the boundaries
of Burara hillside was not a social but a geographical demarcation,
based on the technical feasibility of the anti-erosion measures. None of
these criteria, however, guaranteed the existence of a ‘social basis ’ to
maintain this technical collaboration among community members.
Because of their close connection to technical end results, the newly cre-
ated community associations were initially perceived as new ‘aid gate-
ways’ – i.e. channels for the development agency to achieve technical
project goals, or for the local population to access support from the ex-
ternal agency.
However, with regard to post-conﬂict reconstruction, the associations
did succeed in creating bridging ties between the diﬀerent ethnic groups.
The NGO kept lists indicating the multi-ethnic and gendered character of
both the associations and their committees ; all associations included both
Hutu and Tutsi. Some associations even had Twa members, an often
forgotten and extremely deprived ethnic minority in the past. But the
creation of bridging associations presented a potentially ‘ false sense’ of
inclusiveness. As already mentioned, the Busoni community has a segre-
gated ethnic outlook: most Tutsi live in the centre, whereas most Hutu
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live in the surrounding hillsides. Because of this clear geographical
segregation, and the presence of a large group of Tutsi in the centre,
ethnicity still played a key role (compared with the other hills studied). As a
result, most associations were Tutsi (centre) or Hutu (hills) dominated.
Members openly indicated that they sought extra Tutsi or Hutu to make
their association multi-ethnic because CIBA asked for it. They called them
Hutu or Tutsi ﬁgurants (or ‘bit players ’). Although this did not result in
exclusion or ethnic tensions within associations, it does indicate that their
multi-ethnic character was to some extent artiﬁcial, in order to meet CIBA
criteria, and did not represent the actual situation on the ground.
Moreover (as highlighted above), the potential ‘bridging’ eﬀect of these
associations was not sustainable : the anti-erosion associations ceased to
exist during the project, while a considerable number of rice association
ceased to exist after the project.
LITA on Tangara colline : associations of the elite
The second case study is the intervention of LITA on Tangara colline.
Of the three studied collines, Tangara was most clearly a CNDD-FDD
stronghold. In Tangara ethnic tensions were not as prevalent as in Burara,
and the 2005 elections presented a more ‘classical ’ political party struggle
between Frodebu and CNDD-FDD. CNDD-FDD won these elections
with a clear majority, which meant that ‘ the party ’ was omnipresent and
had an evident militant character.
LITA’s project in Tangara was set up around the construction of
le hangar, a storage facility for agricultural production. It was managed
by a committee representing local community associations in Tangara,
and was responsible for the core activity of the LITA project : a seed
credit system with local agricultural producers. LITA asked the
local population to form associations, after which they received a seed
credit of beans, peanuts etc. Afterwards, the associations reimbursed the
credit to the committee for the hangar, which used it to supply other
groups.
LITA was the Consortium member which focused most on partici-
patory group-oriented processes, and was a strong advocate of an
‘associational ’ approach: associations were identiﬁed as the main end-
beneﬁciaries, storehouses were opportunities to create local structures of
cooperation and collaboration, and great eﬀorts were made to support
these participatory processes. The end goal of the project was the partici-
patory process rather than technical end results. As a consequence, the
staﬀ composition was the opposite of CIBA: social workers outnumbered
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technical staﬀ, and local NGO staﬀ was less visible in the ﬁeld, as rigorous
technical supervision by NGO staﬀ was less necessary.
In terms of the intervention strategy, this translated into a more bottom-
up laisser-faire approach in introducing community associations. In con-
trast to CIBA, LITA used a relatively open-ended approach for the
creation and development of community associations. Their use was
not linked to speciﬁc technical end results : LITA only required the as-
sociations to be agricultural, multi-ethnic and formalised (registration,
statutes and so on). Apart from these requirements, all community
members could create or join an association and each association
could deﬁne its own goals and activities. To motivate the population,
LITA oﬀered the associations seed credits and the storage facilities in the
hangar.
In other words, unlike CIBA, LITA went beyond a technical approach,
and left more room to integrate the associations into community social life.
In doing so, an attempt was made to merge an exogenous approach with
local dynamic processes of social capital. However, LITA still encountered
major problems. The reason was that associations, as new institutional
settings, did not develop into ‘building blocks ’ of bridging social capital.
Instead, they reproduced locally ‘unresponsive’ linking capital (Putnam
2004: 669), manifest in personalised patron–client ties. This began with
the problem of elite capture.
Elite capture of community associations had some history on Tangara
colline. People explicitly referred to the breaking up of the ‘mother of all
associations’, Twiyungure, to explain where and when this problem began.
The Twiyungure association started in an IDP site near Rugari in Muyinga
province, to which Tutsi from Tangara ﬂed after the 1993 violence. When
the security situation improved, these Tutsi returned to a resettlement
camp in Tangara, and brought their association with them. At that time, it
was the only association in Tangara colline, and was supported by WFP. It
was subsequently audited and found to be mismanaged, before the presi-
dent disappeared with the association’s funds. Instead of staying uniﬁed in
one association, several members of the committee of Twiyungure, who
belonged to the local elite, took advantage of the situation and formed
their own association, motivated by a possible collaboration with the
WFP. The ‘associational logic ’ in accessing aid was therefore already
understood by the local elite. In addition, with the arrival of LITA’s
livelihood project access to project beneﬁts was made conditional on
membership in associations. As such, the local elite applied the same ‘as-
sociational logic ’, many of them becoming presidents of their own newly
created associations to access external aid. The strong position of the local
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CNDD-FDD political elite and administration was another factor which
enhanced elite capture.
In the case of the LITA project, most of the associations were captured
by le club d’hangar or ‘ the storehouse committee’ : a small group of local
petty traders and members of the local administration under the leader-
ship of the chef de colline. This committee centralised the control and
supervision of project activities ; in particular, all LITA seed credits were
channelled through the storehouse. The powerful intermediary role of the
club was based on the fact that committee members played two diﬀerent
roles : they not only distributed the seed credits among the associations but
also received seed credits as presidents of their own associations.
Therefore, the local elite occupied most leadership positions in both the
associations and the storehouse committee.
This problem of elite capture had two main consequences. First
of all, most associations had problems of internal mismanagement.
The democratic character of the associations was minimal : presidents
rarely accepted criticism, there were no information meetings, members
were not informed about the ﬁnancial situation, and presidents made ﬁ-
nancial transactions without any control. There were many reports of
corruption and embezzlement of project funds. The question then is : why
did ordinary members still accept these associations? Some associations
did cease to exist, but most carried on. The reasoning of the members
reﬂected the ‘pareto improvement’ argument of Platteau (2004) in
his work on elite capture in West Africa. They preferred unfair
practices within their associations while still receiving some aid, rather
than quitting the associations and losing all hope, as membership of the
association still yielded a pareto improvement (ibid. : 227). Both parties
were also dependent on each other : the elite needed farmers to populate
their associations, farmers needed a member of the elite with links to le club
d’hangar.
A second consequence of elite capture of the community associations
was its impact on the broader community. The associations not only cre-
ated internal problems, but also pitted diﬀerent groups against one an-
other within the community. Associations worked exclusively rather than
inclusively. First, their unparalleled splitting and multiplication created
jealousy and tensions between them. Membership was kept to a minimum
in order to maximise proﬁts. A teacher (Tangara 2007 int.) of the local
primary school said:
Mostly, the creation of associations is done secretly, not everyone can join.
If you’re not a friend of the creator [of the association], you can’t know
an association has been created, and if you ask thereafter to join, he will ask a
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high contribution. Then they are sure that other people will not come to their
association and that the beneﬁts are for a small group of people.
As a consequence, new associations popped up at regular intervals, in-
creasing competition between them to access external aid. In this respect,
the situation in Tangara reﬂects an inverse evolution – the opposite – of
the assumed linear progression of community associations. Instead of
opening up to new members or seeking synergy with other associations
(transforming bonding into bridging social capital), the multiplication of
associations further fragmented the social arena in Tangara commune
(creating more of the same bonding social capital). Second, a vast majority
of poor people who simply could not aﬀord to pay the membership fees or
were not ‘ invited’ by the elite to join an association felt excluded from the
LITA project, as they received no beneﬁts at all. In their perception, the
associational strategy of LITA deprived them of fair and equal develop-
ment opportunities. It was clear to them that if LITA wanted to include
everybody, this could not be achieved via associations.
In sum, community associations did succeed in syncretising with local
endowments of social capital. Unfortunately, they reproduced ‘un-
responsive’ linking social capital (Putnam 2004: 669; Titeca & Vervisch
2008). On the one hand, the internal organisation of many associ-
ations mirrored existing vertical relations between patrons (president/
committee) and clients (ordinary members), resulting in mismanagement
and a lack of accountability and participatory decision-making processes.
On the other, and in line with the ‘critical ’ civil society literature, as-
sociations reproduced existing power structures within the community,
and intensiﬁed feelings of exclusion, because of elite capture.
This in turn questions the ethnic focus when promoting bridging com-
munity associations. As the Burundian conﬂict is analysed as an ethnic
conﬂict, most post-conﬂict activities focus on reconciling the two main
ethnic groups. However, members of these associations in Tangara, when
consulted, immediately mentioned that ethnic groups and women were
both represented; they were even more proud that Twa were also mem-
bers of their association (cf. CIBA in Burara). They knew how external
actors analysed ‘their ’ conﬂict, and therefore automatically used this dis-
course. Still, ethnic tensions never caused problems in the associations,
and in this way they succeeded in creating bridging capital.
However, the associations did create economic exclusion. Access to
project funds through community associations was a privilege of the local
elite, while the vast majority of the community was excluded from mem-
bership. This exclusionary governance of associations resulted in a con-
crete example of structural violence, as discriminatory access deprived
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people of new opportunities to enhance their situation. This triggered
tensions within the community, but not along ethnic lines.9 The LITA
case therefore illustrates how a tailored focus on multi-ethnic associations
may create a ‘ false sense’ of inclusiveness on the ground (the multi-ethnic
and bridging character of the associations). It may also neglect or repro-
duce a more general, deep-seated problem of social exclusion (the exclu-
sionary and ‘unresponsive’ linking character of the associations), because
it produces economic, rather than ethnic, exclusion.
CLC on Cumba colline – a hillside without associations
The third case study is the intervention of CLC on Cumba colline. At the
political level, the 2005 elections also brought a clear victory for the
CNDD-FDD in Cumba: the party controlled almost all administrative
positions. But in contrast to Tangara, at the time of research the party was
not militant at all, and people dissociated themselves from it and mis-
trusted party members. The main reason was the general mistrust and fear
of the ruling CNDD-FDD party, after the killing of thirty-one civilians in
the region by the army and Service National de Renseignement (SNR), because
of alleged collaboration with the FNL rebels (HRW 2006: 18). Therefore,
the population’s support and enthusiasm for the CNDD-FDD party rap-
idly decreased after the elections, and local administration did not hold a
strong position on Cumba colline.
All three NGOs used the Livelihood Consortium to switch to a more
long-term development logic, by rolling out sustainable household liveli-
hood strategies. However, CLC on Cumba colline most clearly translated
this shift into a reduction in the distribution of material resources : in
contrast to CIBA’s ‘ technical ’ and LITA’s ‘associational ’ approach, CLC
focused on changing individual behaviour and attitudes, and enhancing
personal knowledge, capacities and skills. CLC thus opted for a close and
constant follow-up of ‘ lead farmers ’ by its encadreurs de base, who are people
living among or close to the target population, and who function as the
contact between the population and provincial CLC staﬀ. In addition to
the political diﬃculties with the CNDD-FDD party, representing an ab-
sent and unpopular local administration, this focus on individual house-
holds and the strong position of the encadreurs de base also left little room for
local administration to cooperate in the CLC project. CLC’s focus on
‘ individual change’ explains their choice of working with individual
households, instead of associations.
The CLC intervention therefore gave us the opportunity to observe
what happened when no external agency was raising awareness and
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motivating the population to create new associations. As might be ex-
pected, almost no associations were found in Cumba. As highlighted
above, the main incentive to create new associations in Burara (CIBA) and
even more in Tangara (LITA) was the project aid accessed through these
associations. The CLC intervention conﬁrms this general observation, by
turning the argument upside down: precisely because external inter-
vention did not channel project aid through associations, associations were
almost non-existent on Cumba colline. According to the local population,
the raison d’eˆtre of associations is to receive aid. As one man explained:
‘There are not many associations because even the associations that exist
did not succeed once to get help from a NGO. That’s why people aban-
don their associations and no new associations are created’ (Focus group,
Cumba 2007 int.). People also explicitly referred to the importance of
patrons who could act as gatekeepers : there was a lack of people willing
to introduce the associations to external agencies in order to receive aid.
As there was no incentive for the elite to interfere with the creation of
associations, the local elite was much less involved in associational life and
no elite capture was mentioned by the population. By contrast, the
population of Cumba blamed the local administration for a lack of in-
itiative because they did not approach NGOs to gain support for as-
sociations, something which also reﬂected the more general deterioration
of relations between the CNDD-FDD administration and the local
population.
The CLC intervention thus shows how reasons, incentives and moti-
vations to create associations on Cumba colline had become structurally
adapted to the presence of external assistance. CLC was even criticised
because it did not work through associations like other international or-
ganisations. This reasoning was based on various experiences. First, CLC
had worked with associations in the past, and the population urgently
asked the organisation to start supporting associations again. However,
this ‘opportunistic ’ intention to access project aid through associations
was exactly the reason why CLC stopped their support. Second, the
population compared their situation with other hillsides : ‘Here we don’t
get [aid]. We hear that associations on other hillsides are supported and
get aid. Why don’t the NGOs come here to support the associations? If
they come, a lot of associations will be formed’ (Focus group, Cumba 2007
int.). Lastly, people compared the CLC project with other projects, for
example the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Support Project (PRASAB)
of the World Bank that was in its initial phase. This nationwide project
was based on a grant system. Local associations could submit a grant
proposal to a provincial committee to implement agricultural or livestock
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activities. For the population, this was a ‘promising’ project, as associ-
ations would be linked to a concrete incentive, so creating the association
was clearly worthwhile. For the population of Tangara it was ultimately
clear that no associations would grow without external interest ; this was
conﬁrmed by the small number of ‘only’ three associations on Cumba
colline.
The Cumba case illustrates the possible long-term eﬀects of the general
policy of external actors in Burundi to support the creation of associations.
The externally driven character of the proliferation of associations in
Burundi has already been noted (Sebudandi & Nduwayo 2002). As a
consequence, the widespread perception of associations as ‘gateways ’ to
aid highlights the general vulnerability of externally driven associations.
It reﬂects a situation in which sustained exposure to exogenous new ‘ in-
stitutional settings ’ (external agencies promoting community associations)
can change endogenous local dynamics of social capital building. In the
long term this may reduce local dynamics of social organisation, as it
becomes less likely that community associations will be nurtured without
external incentives in the future (Crowley et al. 2005: 15).
: : :
All three case studies highlight diﬀerent problems in the constructability of
social capital, and more particularly, the failure of the three interventions
to initiate a fragile process of ‘ institutional syncretism’. First, CIBA illus-
trates how an exogenous process of social capital building can remain
exogenous. A ‘strong’ social engineering approach led to ‘alien’ associ-
ations, i.e. externally introduced ‘ institutional settings ’ which nevermerged
with locally produced social capital endowments. With its focus on tech-
nical end results, CIBA gave the local population few opportunities to
adapt their social life to the newly introduced institutional settings. The
associations never disassociated from the project, functioning as technical
subcontractors.
Second, LITA illustrates how an exogenous process of social capital
building can merge with endogenous social capital endowments ; but this
does not automatically bring positive eﬀects : their ‘ soft ’ social engineering
approach (bottom-up and open-ended) led to ‘uncivic ’ associations, as
they adapted towards locally produced ‘unresponsive’ forms of linking
capital. Through LITA’s soft approach, room was left for the local
population to merge the new institutional setting of the associations with
local norms and rules of social organisation. Because of elite capture, the
associations became too embedded in existing vertical patron–client ties.
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Finally, CLC demonstrates how endogenous social capital endowments
may be adapted towards exogenous processes of social capital building. It
shows how a policy of external support in creating organisations for the
poor aﬀects the broader environment and diminishes local dynamics of
the poor in organising themselves (Crowley et al. 2005: 17).
Our critique of ‘ social engineering’ (or the ‘ technical ﬁx’) of com-
munity associations does not mean that external interventions are auto-
matically ﬂawed. Any external development intervention is de facto about
‘ social engineering’. In line with the ‘critical ’ literature on civil society,
the above cases rather show that using community associations as ‘uni-
versal blueprints ’ leads to ‘ institutional monocropping’ : the replacement
of local social dynamics and practices with those of more advanced so-
cieties, without tailoring these to the local context (Evans 2004). Equally,
the cases show that existing endowments of social capital need to be ap-
proached with great care, as they can have a profoundly negative eﬀect.
They should not automatically be preferred above exogenous ‘ institu-
tional settings ’ simply because of their ‘ local ’ character. Institutional
syncretism therefore is an extremely fragile exercise, which is summarised
in this section.
On the one hand, there is the problem of overly ambitious external
initiatives of ‘ social engineering’ of social capital and community as-
sociations. First, development practice to a great extent is driven by
the culture of the organisations and their attempts to present their actions
as examples of authorised policy (Mosse 2004). The aims of all three
Consortium partners in playing their role of ‘ institutional entrepreneur’
and strengthening multi-ethnic social cohesion reﬂects their attempt to
present their work as examples of contemporary post-conﬂict reconstruc-
tion policy. This policy prescribes the integration of economic and social
reconstruction, i.e. the restoration of social cohesion and local conﬂict
resolution capacity while bringing development (Duﬃeld 2002). In ad-
dition, the organisational cultures and philosophies of the diﬀerent
Consortium partners substantially guided the practical realisation of this
objective: CIBA’s ‘ technical ’ focus explained the rather technical ﬁnality
of most of the associations on Burara colline, while LITA’s focus on partici-
patory group processes explained their clear ‘associational ’ approach,
and CLC’s emphasis on ‘ individual change’ their choice of working with
households and not with associations. Second, the three cases highlight the
importance of the ‘right ’ tangible incentives and the functioning of ‘ in-
centivised voluntarism’ (Gillinson 2004: 6). All three cases have at least
one issue in common: community associations were primarily perceived as
‘gateways ’ to aid: people’s voluntarism was incentivised, as the project aid
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redirected members’ motivations. The cases generally indicate that the
incentive should be designed as an initiator but not as the most important
motivator of participants’ behaviour; the external incentive has to be
substituted by an internal incentive (which should preferably be more at-
tractive). Development agencies need to tailor their incentives, adapting
them to the local situation. At present, they are driven more by the need to
disburse funds and distribute resources, rather than focusing on the local
dynamics of associational life, i.e. they need to act in keeping with policy
and donor logics, more than with the needs on the ground (cf. de Sardan
2005: 141).
On the other hand, the above cases show how even within the same
region, three external interventions generate very diﬀerent results on three
diﬀerent collines ; and therefore show the importance of detailed contextual
knowledge of prior social capital endowments. On each of the three collines
there was a diﬀerent interplay between the intervention and the local
political settings. In Tangara, the strong position of the CNDD-FDD
party went hand in hand with the elite capture of community associations
during project implementation. In Cumba, the blaming of the local ad-
ministration for not looking for donor aid to create local associations
partly reﬂected the more general friction between the local population and
the CNDD-FDD party. In Burara, next to the technical focus and close
follow-up of the NGO, the strong (geographical) ethnic segregation re-
vealed the donor-driven and ‘artiﬁcial ’ sense of inclusiveness : in reality
most associations were Tutsi (centre) or Hutu (hills) dominated, and many
ceased to exist during or after the end of the project. In general, the brief
historical summary shows why vibrant community associations are not
self-evident in Burundian society. It highlights how: (a) patron–client ties
play an important role; (b) social organisation is weak beyond the family ;
and (c) the civil war shattered social cohesion and organisation. It enables
us to better understand why associations did not evolve as expected. This
is not to say that associations, as new ‘ institutional settings ’, cannot be-
come a promising element in the further development of Burundian so-
ciety, as this would follow a radical ‘endowment’ view, in which societies
are rigid and can only change over longer periods of time. Still, it reminds
us not to underestimate the thriving force of history.
In summary, if one accepts that development projects within a context
of ‘ liberal peace’ are always about ‘social engineering’, the above cases
indicate that the real challenge lies in developing new ‘ institutional set-
tings ’ that are ‘ soft ’ enough to adapt to prior social capital endowments,
but ‘ strong’ enough to change or reinforce these endowments to bring
positive results. In sum, the task is to avoid both the absence (cf. the CIBA
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case) and ‘excess ’ (cf. the LITA case) of institutional syncretism (Galvan
2007: 70).
With regard to post-conﬂict reconstruction, the three described case
studies question the ability of the ‘ liberal peace’ model to produce the
desirable outcomes desired by donors and the international community,
precisely because this fails to reach such institutional syncretism and
is instead caught in ‘universal blueprints ’ of institution building – or ‘ in-
stitutional monocropping’ (Evans 2004) – to favour processes of demo-
cratisation and post-conﬂict reconstruction.
The general idea of multi-ethnic ‘bridging’ associations sheds some light
on the matter. First, our micro-level analysis of the diﬃculties of building
bridging associations in three communes demonstrates how the develop-
ment of outward instead of inward legitimacy generates substantial pro-
blems: legitimacy is developed towards external donors rather than the
‘ inward’ constituency. Concretely, the idea of ‘ethnic inclusiveness ’ is
developed more for the donor audience than for the ethnic groups as such:
in the case of CIBA, the multi-ethnic character of the newly created as-
sociations was unrelated to the actual ethnically segregated and sometimes
tense situation in the community. These processes of external legitimacy
also created problems of accountability and participation within the as-
sociations: in the LITA case, the ‘ false sense’ of inclusiveness even worked
as a smokescreen, as these multi-ethnic ‘bridging’ associations reproduced
the more fundamental problem of ‘unresponsive’ linking social capital,
resulting in economic instead of ethnic exclusion.
Second, in line with the critique on community associations within the
liberal peace model, it has become clear that community associations are
no ‘universal blueprints ’ to create social capital (e.g. Molenaers 2003), but
are deeply embedded in their social and political context, reproducing
existing tensions and power structures. Uvin (2005) argues that the intro-
duction of such institutions at a national level in Burundi has installed a
liberal-democratic fac¸ade, without substance or content, as the existing
system and power structures undermine the imported system from
the inside out. The LITA case describes exactly the same process on a
micro-scale, with a disconnection between the structural and cognitive
components of social capital (Molenaers 2003: 114). Moreover, although a
multitude of bridging community associations were present (structural
component, as a liberal-democratic ‘ fac¸ade’), these were disconnected
from their horizontality and embedded trust (cognitive component), and
adjusted towards the existing ‘system’ of vertical power relations. As such,
the idea of bridging associations in the Burundian context presents us with
a micro-manifestation of one of the main shortcomings of this ‘ liberal
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peace’ model : its incapacity and unwillingness to enter into dialogue and
syncretise with local institutional settings. In doing so, international donors
therefore fail to acknowledge to existence of local resources and make local
development dependent on international presence (Belloni 2007: 111).
N O T E S
1. On the history of conﬂict in Burundi see Daley 2006, 2008; Lemarchand 1995, 2009; Reyntjens
1993, 2000; and Uvin 1999, 2009.
2. See for example the World Bank website on the Social Capital Initiative, http://go.worldbank.
org/XSV70MA600, accessed 2.10.2009.
3. Clearly, this case-study approach does not allow for generalisations for the entire scope of the
projects, or for the whole of Burundi or other external interventions.
4. For the sake of discretion the identity of the diﬀerent NGOs is not disclosed. We use pseudo-
nyms, which stand for Consortium Inititative Burara (CIBA), Livelihoods Tangara (LITA) and
Cumba Livelihood Consortium (CLC).
5. To determine the number of focus groups, we used the concepts of redundancy and theoretical
saturation (Krueger & Casey 2001). Generally between six to ten people participated in the focus
groups, which conforms to the rule of thumb (Patton 2002: 385). In total, eighty-one focus groups were
conducted with a total of 693 participants. In addition, seventy-seven interviews were conducted with
key actors (NGO staﬀ, local administration etc.).
6. The LSIC was a collaboration of four NGOs. It was present in four northern and central
provinces: Gitega, Karuzi, Muyinga and Kirundo. For practical (time and ﬁnancial) and methodo-
logical (similar context, diﬀerent intervention strategies) reasons the research focused on three NGO
projects in the northern provinces of Kirundo and Muyinga.
7. This is a clear example of how ‘counting associations’ is used as a proxy indicator (or a short cut)
to measure all kinds of complex social processes (in this case, local capacity for conﬂict resolution). It
reﬂects both the demand from donors to present measurable results (numbers and percentages), and
the popularity of Putnam’s equation of social capital with associations, precisely because it makes social
capital a measurable concept in the hands of policy makers.
8. Personal communication with technician of ISABU (Institut Supe´rieure de l’Agronomie Burundais)
working in particular with the farmers of the Muhembuzi wetland, May 2008.
9. An illustrative example on this point was the fact that both the current (CNDD-FDD party and
Hutu) and former (Uprona party and Tutsi) chef de collines were members of le club d’hangar and
controlled much of the project beneﬁts together.
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